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                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                     EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                       Nos. 12-CR-016-WFN-1
              Plaintiff,
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                                             12-CR-016-WFN-2
                                             12-CR-016-WFN-5
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   VS.
                                             12-CR-016-WFN-6
6 JERAD JOHN KYNASTON,
                                             12-CR-016-WFN-7
   SAMUEL MICHAEL DOYLE,
                                       May 31, 2012
7 BRICE CHRISTIAN DAVIS,
                                       Spokane, Washington
   JAYDE DILLON EVANS,
   TYLER SCOTT McKINLEY,
                                       Transcript of:
                                       Second Pretrial Conference
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             Defendants.
                                       and Motion Hearing
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               BEFORE THE HONORABLE WM. FREMMING NIELSEN
                  SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12
13 APPEARANCES:
14 For the Plaintiff:
                             Russell E. Smoot
                             Assistant United States Attorney
15
                             P.O. Box 1494
                             Spokane, WA 99210-1494
16
                             Robert R. Fischer
17
   For Defendant Kynaston:
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                             Washington and Idaho
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                             Spokane, WA 99201
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21
                             Debra Kinney Clark, RPR, CSR
   Reported By:
                             United States District Courthouse
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                             P.O. Box 700
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                             Spokane, WA 99210
                             (509) 458-3433
24
   Proceedings reported by mechanical stenography; transcript
   produced by computer-aided transcription.
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(May 31, 2012; 9:32 a.m.)
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             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: United States of America v.
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   Jerad John Kynaston, et al., Case No. CR-12-0016-WFN. Time set
   for second pretrial conference.
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             THE COURT: And motions. And I'm interested in the
   defense motion to suppress the evidence. Mr. Wall, you filed a
  motion --
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        (The courtroom deputy and the Court conferred off the
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   record.)
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             THE COURT:
                         Oh. Excuse me. Yes. I'm going to ask
  Ms. Knutson to do a roll call for the defendants first.
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             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: For the defendants, we have
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  Robert Fischer with Defendant Kynaston, Defendant 1;
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   George Trejo, Jr., for Defendant 2, Mr. Doyle. We have
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  Mark Prothero in place of David Miller for Defendant Davis,
   Defendant 5; Mr. Nicolas Vieth for Defendant Evans, No. 6; and
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  Richard Wall for Defendant 7, Mr. McKinley. And for the
   government, we have Mr. Russell Smoot.
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             THE COURT: Good to see you all here.
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        As I started to say, I'm interested in that motion to
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   suppress the evidence. The change in the medical marijuana law
   I think has a significant effect on this case. Prior to
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   July 22nd of last year, it arguably was a crime to possess
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  marijuana in any amount. But if you qualified under the medical
  marijuana law, as I understand it, that statute gave you an
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affirmative defense.

But then in July -- I think it was July 22nd -- of last year, a new statute -- or -- the statute was changed. And the effect of that change is that you can't be charged. In other words, it's a total decriminalization as long as you complied with the amounts of marijuana; in other words, if you complied with the statute itself.

So, Mr. Wall, I think you've raised the issue. The affidavit which I've read does not make any reference at all to the statute, nor does it contain any information or any statement as to the amount of marijuana that the officers suspected was there. And if -- if it was -- if there's no allegation that the state law had been violated, that raises the issue as to whether or not it was a valid warrant, a valid search.

There are two other issues that are related to this, and that — one is whether or not the good faith exception would apply in view of the fact that the new law became effective July 22nd and this search was the first day or two of November. So there was a period of about three months in there. Would reasonable officers be expected to understand that the law had changed? And the warrant on its face arguably did not show probable cause. And secondly — and I don't know how strong the argument would be — is there sufficient information in the affidavit to raise the inference that the amount that the

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officers suspected was there at the house would be in excess of
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  that which is allowed under the medical marijuana statute?
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        How do you want to proceed? Mr. Smoot?
             MR. SMOOT: The government's ready. I don't know if
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   the Court wants to hear from the defendant first or the
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   government.
             THE COURT: Well --
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             MR. SMOOT: I mean, it's --
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             MR. WALL: Judge --
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             MR. SMOOT: -- somewhat of a -- oh. Go ahead.
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   sorry.
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             MR. WALL: I didn't mean to interrupt. But my -- one
  issue that I had just been discussing with co-defense counsel
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  prior to coming in this morning is that there was a motion filed
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   subsequent to the filing of our suppression motion to continue
   the trial date and also continue dates for filing pretrial
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  motions and for hearing pretrial motions. And I believe that
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   there's -- it's anticipated that there will be additional
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   motions to suppress the evidence based upon the search warrant
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   that have -- on other grounds, that may or may not have some
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   overlap. And I don't know how the Court views whether or not
   those motions affect whether or not the Court should hear this
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  motion at this time or not.
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             THE COURT: Well, I don't know what those other
  motions are going to be. The Court is willing to continue this
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hearing in anticipation of other motions and hear them all together.

Mr. Fischer?

MR. WALL: Yeah. Maybe it would be appropriate to hear from Mr. Fischer at this time.

THE COURT: You have -- I know you have a 404(b) motion pending, Mr. Fischer.

MR. FISCHER: I do, Your Honor; and I also have a motion to continue the pretrial and trial dates, and I filed that May 11th. And that's Document No. 167.

The basis for the motion, Your Honor, is: As we know — well, as this Court is very much aware of, having sat on the bench for the several years that this Court has heard other drug cases where there are qualifiers or predicates that could enhance statutorily, under the guidelines, a punishment — my client — it's been alleged, having reviewed the convictions of my client in this state and other states, that there is potential for those enhancements or pre-qualifiers — qualifiers — to enhance his punishment.

Having said that, then, we commonly try to work out something with the government, or the government and the defendant or defendants try to work something out prior to a pretrial, and -- so that -- to avoid a filing of an 851. And that's for many reasons. And I understand the reasons, and I understand the reasons of the government -- that it has to put

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its files in order, compare punishments to other defendants, et cetera, and then come up with what it thinks is fair and reasonable. And then the defendant and defendants have to have a chance, of course, to review that and give it time to -- to look at it and compare it to what the actual outcome could be if convicted.

So having said that, I received an unofficial plea agreement from the government late Friday afternoon. I wanted to get it over to my client over the weekend, but prior commitments in Benton County or Bonner County precluded that. So the first time I could get to see my client was Tuesday, and I provided that plea agreement. And it's a fairly heavy penalty within the plea agreement itself; and so I have -- and the deadline, of course, was today to accept or reject. And I'm sure that Mr. Smoot would give more time for that. But the idea is is that you don't file any substantive motions until you can reach some sort of plea or start negotiations and find an offer that the government is willing to put forward to the committee. So we haven't filed any substantive motions except for a discovery motion that I had attached and that I had subpoenaed today from -- I had issued a subpoena to the Spokane County Records Department to provide an unredacted version of what I attached to my motion to continue. And that is a CAD report for the -- that includes the investigations that began on October 19th of 2011, or at least, according to the CAD report,

where the investigation was initiated by what appears to be somebody unknown calling in to 911, indicating that there's — that there's an underage drinking party and also several rooms and greenhouses devoted to a marijuana grow — interestingly enough, at a different address. And I received that, and it was redacted. And Mr. Smoot and I talked earlier before this hearing; and he understood that perhaps I had gotten everything I needed, and I didn't. So I wanted those records today so that I could try to file additional pretrial motions, which I think are very important in this case, one of them being a motion to suppress, if we can't get together on some sort of plea that's acceptable for both parties.

THE COURT: I think we have a prior provision in a prior order that a motion filed by one defendant automatically applies to all of them.

MR. FISCHER: Correct.

THE COURT: Don't we? So no one has opted out, so Mr. Wall's motion applies to all -- all defendants, as far as I know.

MR. FISCHER: Absolutely. And what I would like to do is also have the opportunity, once I get this information, which Mr. Smoot indicated that he would get to me today -- the unredacted version of this CAD report, which is instrumental in additional motions. So that's why I'm asking for a continuance. So once I get this information from Mr. Smoot -- and he

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indicated he'd get it to me ASAP -- then I can take a look at
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  the new information and file appropriate motions.
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        Now, I --
             THE COURT: Let me ask -- are you suggesting another
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  motion to suppress for different reasons than the one raised by
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  Mr. Wall?
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             MR. FISCHER: Yes.
                                 It would be a motion to suppress,
  I guess, unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth
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  Amendment, obviously, and that the warrant that was issued is
   also unsatisfactory -- the affidavit in support of it.
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             THE COURT: For reasons different than those raised by
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  Mr. Wall?
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             MR. FISCHER: Yes, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: All right. Well, the Court has no problem
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   in giving you more time if you want to do that. I think
   Mr. Wall's motion is -- might be dispositive.
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             MR. FISCHER: And it very well could be. I've read
   the motion, and I certainly do join in that motion.
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             THE COURT: Well, if there are other motions you
   anticipate that would strengthen Mr. Wall's motion or support it
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   in some other way, I'm glad to give you more time.
             MR. FISCHER: Well, Your Honor, if Mr. Wall's motion
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  is dispositive and -- or could be dispositive, and the Court
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   would entertain it today, certainly I'm in support of that.
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  was just advising the Court that I would be filing additional
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motions, and one of them would be a suppression motion. And I
  think it would be for different reasons other than noncompliance
  with state law.
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             THE COURT: Well, how do you want to proceed?
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             MR. FISCHER: I would ask for a continuance until --
  at least to file additional motions -- into late July -- it's my
   understanding the Court is not available in August -- and to
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  have my suppression motion heard in early September.
             THE COURT: How -- well, let me ask you this. How
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  long would it take you to file your motion?
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             MR. FISCHER: It would take me until the end of June.
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12 And I say that, Your Honor, because I need to go over the
   information that Mr. Smoot is going to give me; follow up on my
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   investigation to do that; and, in connection with the other
   ongoing issues that I have, filing a cert. petition.
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             THE COURT: Well, I'd rather not set this over into
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   September, for this reason. If the motions have merit -- and,
   on the surface, they appear to be good motions -- I'd like to
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   get them resolved because I anticipate -- or -- I suspect that
   one or more of the defendants are in custody.
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             MR. FISCHER: My client is in custody.
             THE COURT: So I would suggest a shorter time for
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   filing, a response by the government in the five days, and a
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   quicker hearing.
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             MR. FISCHER: And when would the Court hear it?
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THE COURT: Well, we can hear it -- let's say you had
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  two weeks to file your motion. Let's say by the 15th of June.
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   We could hear it sometime the last week of this month.
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             MR. FISCHER: Your Honor, would it -- would the Court
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  be available the second week of July?
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             THE COURT: We're in Yakima, Mr. Knutson, on the 9th?
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        (The courtroom deputy and the Court conferred off the
   record.)
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             THE COURT: So we're here 10th. We're here July 10th.
   Yes.
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             MR. FISCHER: That would be -- that would be fine,
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12 Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Smoot?
                         I was just going to indicate that the
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             MR. SMOOT:
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  present trial date is June 25th. If the Court was looking at
   the end of -- end of June for a hearing, it would seem that we
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   could get pleadings done by then.
             THE COURT: We'd have to continue the trial date,
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   obviously; and that would require that everyone be advised of
   their -- well, no. The speedy trial time runs out on the 19th
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   of July. So there is time.
        All right. If you want to do that, if you want to support
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  Mr. Wall's motion with your own motion, I'm not going to
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   discourage you from doing that. But I would suggest that then
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   you'd have till June 22nd to file; June 29th, the government's
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response; a hearing on the motions, pretrial conference on
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   July 10th.
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             MR. FISCHER: Very good, Your Honor.
             THE COURT: At what time, Ms. Knutson?
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        (The courtroom deputy and the Court conferred off the
   record.)
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             THE COURT: At 1:00.
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        Mr. Trejo?
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             MR. TREJO: Your Honor, not to -- not to step on my
  good friend Mr. Fischer's toes, but the -- we would discuss the
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   other motion to suppress that we anticipate filing in this case;
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   and it's apples and oranges, compared to Mr. Wall's issue that
  he's presented to the Court. The motion to suppress that we
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   anticipate filing deals with the possibility of a Franks hearing
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   of information that was omitted from the affidavit for search
   warrant, the warrant -- what we perceive to be the warrantless
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   entry onto the property, the warrantless observation into the
   residence, the --
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             THE COURT: That's fine. Can you get it all filed on
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   the --
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             MR. TREJO: Yeah. We can get it all filed in that
  time. But what I'm suggesting to the Court is there's no reason
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  not to hear Mr. Wall's motion today because we can go -- he can
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   go forward on that. And then we can go forward on the other
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   one, if necessary.
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THE COURT: I have no problem with that.

MR. TREJO: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. I started with a little dialogue when we came out here. Anybody take issue with what I said as to the Court's understanding of the facts and the change in the law as it may apply, and the issues?

I think, Mr. Smoot, you may have the laboring oar on this.

MR. SMOOT: Thank you, Your Honor.

Respectfully, while the law may be in a constant state of change and flux concerning marijuana within the state, that doesn't -- that does not mean that whether or not a medical affirmative defense or certain conditions precedent to the commission of the general crime of manufacturing or distribution or possession of marijuana simply negates the opportuni -negates law enforcement's ability to investigate a potential offense. In this case, let's say that -- well, quite frankly, Your Honor, I think that -- rather to -- rather than go into detail, I think that the briefing is quite detailed on both parties. And I would submit that despite the change in the wording from affirmative defense to may not be arrested, contraband may not be seized, it does not repeal the general law prohibiting the manufacture and distribution and/or possession of marijuana within the state statutes. And having that law still in effect, RCW 69.50.401 still having effect, law enforcement is still charged with the investigation of that

particular valid law. It hasn't been repealed by the legislature. They certainly could have repealed that while amending the language to the compassionate use statute. They did not. Nor did <u>Fry</u> -- nor is there any indication that <u>Fry</u> has been reversed or withdrawn by statute.

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The bottom line is that in a case like this, law enforcement was investigating what it believed to be a potential offense, that being RCW 69.50.401, that being the manufacturing of marijuana, a crime in Washington state, a crime in the federal law. In their search warrant, they put, in brief -- I guess the Court has had the search warrant -- everything that would typically be seen in a search warrant of an investigation establishing probable cause for a marijuana grow. There was the odor of marijuana, there was excessive power usage, there was a visual observation of marijuana stems through the window, there was a visual observation of growing equipment, and there were vehicles -- a vehicle that was parked at the property that was tied back to a person that had a prior conviction for a marijuana offense. All of those things would stand alone on the four corners of the affidavit to support probable cause to search for a violation of 69.50.401.

THE COURT: I think that's clear that -- had that occurred before July 22nd.

MR. SMOOT: Well, Your Honor, I think that -here's -- here's the question, then. What does a state law

enforcement officer have to put in an affidavit in order to investigate a potential offense? Not --

that that officer said that there were more than 45 plants visible through the front door. That would indicate that the grow was not in compliance with the medical marijuana act. But the affidavit was totally silent on the amount. And I think it's clear. I disagree with you. The language of 69.51A.040 says that — in effect, that medical use of marijuana does not constitute a crime. So there has to be some indication, it seems to me, in the search warrant that what was involved here was marijuana in a quantity at least that was noncompliant with the state law; and there's no reference to it.

MR. SMOOT: Yes. Your Honor, I think that that begs the question, then: How does law enforcement obtain that type of information? In fact, if law enforcement has all the indications of a violation of the general marijuana statute but has no ability to determine whether or not an individual is in compliance with very strict, specific conditions precedent to whether or not they violated that statute, then that investigation can never be accomplished through a search warrant. In other words, Your Honor, search warrants are simply whether that it's more probable — that there's a probability that evidence of a crime may be found in the location searched.

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Just because a search warrant is issued for a location doesn't necessarily follow that law enforcement is always going to find evidence of a crime. In this case, the law enforcement officers believed that it was likely that evidence of the general marijuana crimes would be found at that location. Had they entered and they would have found one person in there with a marijuana card and a 13-plant grow, then they would have had a decision to make. Have they violated the main general marijuana law that we are -- we believe we have probable cause to investigate, or have they not? Whether it's simply no longer a crime or whether it's an affirmative defense, the result is still the same. There has to be certain conditions precedent. And when they show up and observe that those conditions are precedent, then they can say: All right; well, we were -- we were mistaken. Our search warrant was not fruitful. But we still had the probable cause to initiate the investigation to do the search warrant. In -- in -- what I wanted to add as well as -- one of -one of the concerns, I believe, in this case or cases like this is the way that the new -- the new provision is written.

one of the concerns, I believe, in this case or cases like this is the way that the new -- the new provision is written. The United States would submit that it indicates that people may not be arrested, contraband may not be seized if the conditions precedent -- if it's compliant with the parameters of the compassionate use provision. Now, I understand that -- from the defendant's reply that there's a disagreement in terms of the

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word use of "may," "may not," "shall," "shall not." But I would submit that one of the reasons -- arguably, one of the reasons for such language is protection of law enforcement.

Now, law enforcement, prior to the compassionate use provision -- had they executed a search warrant, found marijuana growing, found contraband, illegal contraband, present in a place that they're executing a search warrant, and had they leave it there, I would argue that they could potentially be under some type of liability if something happens from leaving contraband in a public -- in with the public in this type of circumstance. When the compassionate use law comes out and all of a sudden now state law enforcement officers have to go into residences like this or other buildings or other locations with a search warrant that's been issued based on a belief that there's going to be evidence of the general -- violation of the general controlled substance act if they enter a place and they find contraband in there, now they're in a position to where they can make a decision as to say: Okay; we were right. was marijuana growing here. Everything that we set forth in the search warrant to obtain probable cause ultimately was correct. We smelled it. Everything. They show up. All right. Here's the circumstance where there's one person. There's 13 plants. I am ad libbing. But let's say that they have their -- a checklist, and they're checking it off. Okay. It looks like all conditions are fine. We've made a record of this. We're

leaving.

Now something happens with that contraband. There's a use of that contraband by someone. Something happens down the line. Law enforcement is no longer liable for leaving that contraband out in the public.

Now -- so it's kind of a twofold argument. The United States, again, believes that this is very simple. It is a legal argument. The warrant itself within the four corners had sufficient information for the violation of the general -- violation of the Washington controlled substance act -- law enforcement, according to state law, state case law, that predates the change in the wording of the compassionate use statute.

THE COURT: That's an important distinction.

MR. SMOOT: I think it is important, yes, because it has changed. But what is the effect of that? Fry is not — there's no indication that Fry's general principle that law enforcement doesn't to prove a negative to do the search warrant or doesn't have to — they would — typically, they would have to prove that all of the conditions precedent — meaning every single person, every single plant was accounted for, every single condition that is required of the compassionate use section, .040, which is still written in there — if the person complies, is in compliance with it, they would have to disprove that first without any — necessarily any way to get that

information in order to pursue what they believe may be a violation of another offense.

THE COURT: Well, it may be less complicated than that. Before July -- and I throw this out as one way to read it. Before July 22nd of last year, if law enforcement had the same indications that the general marijuana statute was being violated, they could charge the crime; and then the defendant would have the affirmative defense that he or she was protected because of the medical marijuana provision.

It seems to me that after July 22nd, the law has changed. Possession or growing marijuana in an amount that is consistent with the medical marijuana law is not a crime. So you don't have an affirmative defense. You just can't be charged. And that's what concerns me in this case. The affidavit doesn't give any indication that there's a state crime that's been violated. It's true there's plenty of indication that marijuana is growing, but there's no indication that it's growing in an amount that takes it out of the medical marijuana exceptions.

MR. SMOOT: Well, I would argue, Your Honor, that even if there were two out of -- I don't know the sum total of how many particular --

THE COURT: Plants.

MR. SMOOT: -- qualifications or conditions need to be met. But let's say that there's two conditions -- one, that somebody has an authorization card and, two, that somebody has

less than a certain number of plants. All right? Even if they had one of those, those conditions would still — it would still be a violation of the general provision if those conditions are not met. In other words, let's say that the person has no authorization to use marijuana through the state and yet they only have ten plants. That still, arguably, falls under the general provision. So — of the violation of possession or manufacturing of marijuana. So, in other words, if law enforcement — the plant count number suddenly may not be necessary. In fact, it would — that's the type of factual item that would arguably almost be impossible for any law enforcement officer to put in an affidavit unless the marijuana plants were growing within a publicly accessible location. Inside a house, it would be — I don't think it would ever be seen in an affidavit.

Arguably, Your Honor, as well, I would submit that there's not an affirmative defense to investigation of a potential crime. Let's take this in a complete different context. A person can be charged for a crime — for an offense that's wholly unrelated to a search warrant. In the context of a federal drug warrant issued by the magistrate, a federal agency goes in, believes absolutely that there's going to be evidence of a drug-trafficking crime within a residence. DEA goes in, executes the search warrant. While they're looking for drugs, they don't find any drugs; but what they — but they find a

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It just so happens that --
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   firearm.
             THE COURT:
                         In plain view.
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                        In plain view or where they should be
             MR. SMOOT:
   looking for drugs.
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        Now they've gone in. They've executed a search warrant on
  the basis of a violation of the drug laws. They go in.
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   find out that they have no evidence that the defendant violated
  the drug laws. But the defendant ultimately violated another
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   law.
         That defendant can be charged. That defendant can be
   convicted of that offense even though the defendant never
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   violated the law that the search warrant was being executed for.
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   In this case --
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             THE COURT: Using your hypothetical, if the search
   warrant had said that law enforcement anticipates that the
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   house -- in the house is a firearm, but it doesn't say that the
   occupant of the house is a felon --
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             MR. SMOOT: Uh-huh?
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             THE COURT: -- the search warrant is not valid, is it?
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             MR. SMOOT:
                        Well, it depends. I mean, if there's not
   something that ties it in to the firearm offense, then it may
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   be -- it may be that -- I mean --
                         The reason I said that is it's not illegal
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             THE COURT:
   to have a firearm in your house. I hope not.
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             MR. SMOOT: That -- as do I, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Yeah. And by the same token, it's not
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medical statute?

illegal to have some marijuana in your house as long as it complies with the medical marijuana statute. And that is the question. MR. SMOOT: THE COURT: In other words, as to amount and that you're sick and you need it. MR. SMOOT: That is the question, Your Honor; and that is the "if" that's there -- if it complies. If it doesn't comply, then it's illegal in both the state of Washington and the federal government. THE COURT: Doesn't the affidavit have to -- does not the affidavit need to contain an allegation that -- that state law is being violated for some reason; in other words, that the officer had reason to believe that there's an excessive amount or that the occupants don't qualify? In other words, there has to be something within the four corners of the affidavit to indicate that that -- not only is marijuana there, but there is marijuana there that takes it out of the exception of the

MR. SMOOT: I would respectfully argue no. And the reason for that is because if the search warrant provides probable cause for a violation of a statute, then that is sufficient. And the -- and our -- and the United States' position is that the search warrant provided probable cause for the violation of the general statute.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree with that. But this

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statute says that if you have marijuana in accordance with the
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  terms of that chapter, it does not constitute a crime. It's not
  a crime, according to the statute.
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             MR. SMOOT: That is --
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             THE COURT: So if the affidavit says that law
  enforcement is aware of the fact that there's marijuana in the
  house, period, is it a valid statute -- I mean -- warrant?
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             MR. SMOOT: I believe it's valid to investigate a
   crime that fits with -- if it provides probable cause for a
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   crime that is on the books.
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             THE COURT: And --
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             MR. SMOOT: And it may --
             THE COURT: -- by saying that, you're referring to the
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  general statute.
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             MR. SMOOT: Right. It may not support a -- the
  investigation ultimately may not support a conviction. It may
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   not support an arrest. It may not support a seizure. But for
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   investigative purposes alone, if the warrant supplies probable
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   cause for a law that is on the books, then law enforcement
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   has -- has a legal authority to execute that search -- that
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   warrant.
                        All right. I think I understand your
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             THE COURT:
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  position.
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             MR. SMOOT:
                         Thank you.
             THE COURT: Mr. Wall? Your turn.
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MR. WALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

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Your Honor, Mr. Smoot is a very good lawyer, a very intelligent and a very creative lawyer; and I commend him for being able to find a way to take a position on this because I think the Court stated the issue very clearly at the beginning of this hearing and that it is pretty black and white. When you read the amendment to the medical marijuana laws in 2011, it's very clear what the legislature was trying to do. It became obvious that making the medical use of marijuana an affirmative defense didn't accomplish what the legislature was trying to accomplish because being subject to arrest, imprisonment, and all the consequences of that wasn't protecting people who were using marijuana for medical purposes. When all you have is an affirmative defense, it's not much protection. You can still be hauled out of your home and thrown in jail, and you may sit there for a long time until you get a chance to put your defense on. So it was obvious the statute wasn't doing what it was intended to do; and the change was made, and it's very clearly stated. As you pointed out more than once, it's no longer a crime to use marijuana or to possess marijuana as long as you conform to the requirements of the statute.

Now, one of the basic fallacies of Mr. Smoot's argument is that he wants to read the statutes as if they're totally separate and not connected in any way, but you cannot do that.

And I think in our reply brief, we cited the cases to the Court

that you must read statutes together, as a whole, to determine the legislative intent. And so Mr. Smoot says, well, ignore the medical marijuana law; look only at the general statute; and we can use that alone to determine whether or not there's probable cause to make a -- commit a -- probable cause that a crime was committed. But, in fact, you cannot do that because it's not a -- it's not a question of whether or not, if you read something in isolation, you can argue a crime was committed. You have to read the statute in its totality to determine what is and what is not a crime, just as Your Honor has pointed out. So that's the basic fallacy, is that you cannot read one part of the statute separate from another, as if they don't exist together, because they do exist together.

Mr. Smoot then takes that and tries to argue that, essentially, if you have reason to investigate, you have enough information to get a warrant, which is, again, not really what the law is. You can investigate based on suspicion. You can investigate based on a hunch. But to get a warrant, to get authorization to go where otherwise you're not legally allowed to go, you have to have probable cause.

So he argued quite a bit about, well, you know, it doesn't -- maybe you're going to go in and not find enough evidence to support a charge, but certainly that -- that happens -- that can happen any time you're investigating a crime and you're -- and you're executing a warrant, because a warrant

is only based on probable cause, not absolute proof. So that argument really doesn't help any because that's always the case.

So the question still has to always come back to: Does this affidavit give the issuing judge enough evidence to determine that, more likely than not, a crime was being committed and the evidence of that crime would be found at the place the officers wanted to search? And as you have pointed out more than once, there's nothing in this affidavit to indicate that what the officers saw at that residence indicated any use or possession or manufacture of marijuana that did not conform with Washington's medical marijuana law. There's just no mention of anything that would allow the issuing judge to say this doesn't — this isn't medical marijuana use in conformance with the Washington law. I've seen —

THE COURT: There are limits, are there not, as to how much is justified?

MR. WALL: Yes. There's nothing to say there's more than 45 plants, which would be the maximum you could have even if you have a communal grow. There's nothing to say that there is possession of more than the allowed amount. There's no mention of whether or not anybody associated with this address has or does not have authorization to use medical marijuana.

You know, some of these things may be difficult for law enforcement officers to obtain, admittedly. It may be difficult. It may not be easy. But the Constitution doesn't

make exceptions just because it's difficult for officers to get information or to get evidence. The Constitution still requires probable cause.

THE COURT: Now, the affidavit does talk about a strong odor. It talks about seeing, apparently in plain sight, through the window, plants and roots and plastic tarp. There's indications they saw piping, greenhouses, frames that are typically used, a high power consumption. Is there enough to suggest by implication that what's going on exceeds the limitations of the marijuana statute, the medical marijuana statute?

MR. WALL: I think maybe there could have been, Your Honor. But what I think is obvious is that these officers weren't up to date on the law. They had no clue that they needed to give that information to the judge.

THE COURT: And that raises another question I had. There's only about 90 days between the change in the law and when all this happened. Does that raise the good faith exception possibility?

MR. WALL: I would say that's -- very clearly shows that there's not good faith because any well-trained officer is going to be informed prior to the law going into effect that on this date, the law changes, and you need to change how you behave out in the field.

THE COURT: So in other words, the officers should

have been aware of it by July 23rd, the day after the law came into effect? That's your position?

MR. WALL: Just as -- just as it is for someone who is charged with a crime that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, it's not an excuse for a law enforcement officer either.

But to get back to your other question, the officers may have been able to very easily here construct an affidavit that would have been sufficient. They may have been able to say:

Based on my experience -- and detailing that experience for the judge -- this kind of power usage is only associated with something well in excess of 45 plants. And the law only allows 45 plants in any one grow, even if you have ten people together, doing a communal grow. We saw other indications that the amount of -- the size of the grow area, the amount of piping or whatever -- the amount of soil we saw present clearly demonstrates in excess of the allowed amount of plants -- and explaining that for the judge who is reading this. But they did none of that. They did absolutely none of that.

Now, I don't know -- I mean, they showed power usage; but I don't know what that means. I don't -- I can't imagine the judge knew either. Unless you're an experienced marijuana grower, you wouldn't have any idea whether that power usage indicates more than the allowed amount of plants. And that's the problem. They just didn't address it in any way in the affidavit.

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So I think Your Honor has, from the beginning, had this
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  pegged right exactly as it is. The law changed dramatically.
  It's a huge change to go from an affirmative defense to this is
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  not a crime. I think it's clear the law enforcement officers in
  this case either weren't aware of it or certainly didn't have
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  that in mind when they wrote this affidavit because they didn't
  address that issue at all. It's like -- Mr. Smoot said it.
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  Yeah. They put in a typical affidavit for establishing that
   marijuana was being grown, but that's all that it establishes.
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   And that affidavit probably would have been -- would have been
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   sufficient probably before July 22nd, 2011.
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             THE COURT: Oh, I think it's clear it would have been.
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             MR. WALL: But afterwards, it's clearly not.
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        Thank you.
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             THE COURT: Now, before, Mr. Smoot, you reply, any
   other defense counsel have anything you want to say? Mr. Vieth,
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   Mr. Trejo, Mr. Fischer?
             MR. VIETH: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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             MR. FISCHER: No, Your Honor.
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             MR. TREJO: Your Honor, just briefly.
        Your Honor, as I -- as I listened to the government's
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   argument, it appears that, in part, what they're arguing is they
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   should be justified in going into the residence with the search
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   warrant and then thereafter determining that, hey, we were
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   right.
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Or wrong. 1 THE COURT: 2 MR. TREJO: Or wrong. And if we were wrong, sorry. 3 But the law does not permit them to do that. They're required to do additional investigation when they have a hunch. 4 5 And when the government argues that they would never be able to enter, well, that's not true, because how many countless cases have we seen throughout the years where they use informants, 7 they use other investigative techniques in order to gain enough 9 information to establish probable cause for -- to enter a residence? And in this case, they simply didn't have sufficient 10 11 facts to warrant the entry. In terms of the power usage, there's -- I've never seen a 12 situation in all the marijuana cases that I've done where 13 there's been any expert opinion or any finding that a certain 14 15 amount of kilowatts is designated per plant. Instead, you could have quite a bit of electric consumption in a particular room 16 17 and just have one plant in there. There's no correlation between the two, unless they would have provided additional 18 information. 19 20 THE COURT: Mr. Fischer, were you going to say 21 something? 22 MR. FISCHER: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Anybody else? Mr. Vieth? Anybody else? 23 Mr. Smoot, any reply? 24 25 MR. SMOOT: Your Honor, I think in brief the

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argument's before the Court. The United States stands by its
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  argument at this point and indicates that the entire affidavit
  has been provided to the Court within the pleadings.
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             THE COURT: Yeah. We -- yes. We have the entire
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  affidavit, as far as I know.
                        That is correct. And while we haven't
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             MR. SMOOT:
   gone into much discussion, I think that the United States has
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  briefed in terms of the good faith exception. I simply want to
   make sure that that's before the Court as well.
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        Respectfully, the United States would again submit that
   there is probable cause for the violation of the Uniform
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   Controlled Substances Act; specifically, RCW 69.50. -- I think
   401 is what I cited.
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             THE COURT: What if the -- what if we just forgot
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   about the controlled substance act and the only statute we had
   was this one that we're talking about, 69.51A.040? That's the
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   only statute.
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             MR. SMOOT: You mean the only statute we have in
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   existence?
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             THE COURT: No. The only statute that applies to this
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   issue that we're talking about. You don't have the general
             You just have -- you just have the one.
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   statute.
             MR. SMOOT: Well, arguably, Your Honor, if we didn't
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   have the general statute, I don't think we'd have the exception
   statute.
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THE COURT: Well, I quess it's not a very good
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   question. But the point I'm trying to make is: If you just had
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   the one statute that I just cited and you didn't say in your
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   affidavit that there was reason to believe that the quantity
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   involved exceeded the amount allowed by the medical marijuana,
  this statute says that would not be a crime.
                                                 In other words,
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   you have to allege that not only there's some marijuana, but it
   exceeds that which is allowed by the medical marijuana statute,
   wouldn't you? And if you don't have probable cause to believe
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   that, then there's no crime.
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             MR. SMOOT: Forgive me. I'm trying to follow Your
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   Honor. I think if --
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             THE COURT: Maybe I'm not very clear in my question.
             MR. SMOOT: I think if the general provision wasn't in
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   existence and only a provision that says this is a crime if you
   don't do A, B, and C -- in other words --
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             THE COURT: You're -- you're relying on the general
   controlled substance act as a justification for getting a search
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   warrant.
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             MR. SMOOT: Yes. For investigative purposes.
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             THE COURT:
                        And I'm suggesting that that statute,
   which says, in effect, there's no crime in possessing marijuana
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   as long as you comply with the medical marijuana act --
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             MR. SMOOT: So if there was no general statute, then
   the statute -- then the statute that would be in existence would
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be written something to the effect that if a person doesn't do
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  A, B, and C, then they have violated the law.
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             THE COURT:
                        Well, is that --
             MR. SMOOT: And -- and --
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             THE COURT: Go ahead.
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             MR. SMOOT: -- I guess if that were the case, then
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   investigations would certainly be conducted differently, if that
   were the only statute in existence.
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        The difficulty is that at this point, the statutes apply
  not only for investigative purposes but also prosecutorial
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   purposes and clear down the line. In this case, again, the
   United States submits that the local officers had a search
   warrant that supported probable cause for a violation of state
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         They also had a search warrant, arguably, that would have
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   supported probable cause had it been presented in federal court,
   under federal standards. So in this case, the law enforcement,
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   local law enforcement, executed an author -- an issued search
   warrant based on probable cause of a violation of an existing --
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   currently existing law.
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             THE COURT: State law.
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             MR. SMOOT: State law -- correct -- as well as while
  they -- while the state law enforcement officers sought it from
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   a state judge, it still would be a violation of federal law.
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  And the search warrant would support probable cause had it
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  been -- arguably, had it been presented to federal court.
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THE COURT: Yeah. But that's not the situation.

MR. SMOOT: But the situation is, however, Your Honor, that law enforcement was conducting an investigation, was conducting a violation -- an investigation of a law on the books. And ultimately, had they entered the premises with the valid -- with the valid -- and I say "valid" in terms of being signed by the state court judge. Had they entered, found out that, in fact, what was occurring was not a violation of the law, then there would have been -- arguably, the investigation would have stopped; or at least it would not have resulted -- gone to the prosecutorial stage, which laws also cover.

Simply put, at this point of the investigation of issuing a search warrant -- of obtaining a search warrant, the law enforcement officers were investigating the general provision that arguably is still valid in the state of Washington and as well as federal law for what -- for what it's worth in terms of federal law.

THE COURT: Well, my inclination is that the search warrant was not complete; and my inclination is that the execution, therefore, was improper, which would then logically suggest that the motion to suppress should be granted.

Now, I -- assuming that's the ruling, what is it that would be suppressed? I guess you'd suppress the physical evidence you found in there. And if I understand it, certain defendants made certain statements following the execution of the search

warrant. Wouldn't those necessarily be referred to as the 1 fruits of the invalid execution? 3 MR. SMOOT: Most likely, Your Honor. I don't want to commit as though there may be an exception. But -- you know --4 most likely, it would be. 5 6 THE COURT: Yeah. That wasn't dealt with in any great 7 length in the briefing, but I assume that would be the case. 8 Well, I'm going to take a look at a couple of cases and get 9 an order out in a day or two. But right now, there are a couple of other motions pending. There's a 404(b) motion filed by you, 10 Mr. Fischer. 11 12 MR. FISCHER: Yes, Your Honor. 13 It seems appropriate that that should be THE COURT: granted. And if I understand it correctly, the government 15 probable has turned over any 404(b) evidence that you have. But I think the responsibility also would be on the government to 16 turn over any 404(b) evidence that comes into your possession or 17 you become aware of. 18 19 MR. SMOOT: Yes, Your Honor. And as typically happens, sometimes during trial interviews, more comes out. 20 And it's the government's position to turn that over. 21 THE COURT: Now, we have a trial date of June 25th. 22 Speedy trial time out is July 19th. I'm suggesting we leave 23 those dates as is. 24

MR. SMOOT: Your Honor, I would just advise the Court,

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as I have advised the parties, that if this case proceeds to
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  trial that, as the Court and the parties are aware, there is a
  question of plant count involved in this case. Simply put,
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  there was approximately five to six hundred growing plants.
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  There were five to six hundred plants that had been removed, and
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  there were just roots remaining of the plants. In terms of the
   conspiracy charge, the United States has indicated that if this
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   case goes to the jury that it would put that plant count
   question before the jury, which would ultimately mean a
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   superseding indictment. None of the facts would change with the
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   superseding indictment, but the -- it would likely be sought
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   either next week or, if the continuance goes beyond the first
   grand jury setting in July, then it would probably be sought
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   then.
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             THE COURT:
                         I suppose, though, if this motion to
   suppress is granted, that would moot that issue.
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                         That is correct.
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             MR. SMOOT:
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             THE COURT: And if -- if the motion is not granted,
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   then what I'm going to do is set another pretrial conference in
   short order and reschedule.
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             MR. SMOOT: All right.
             THE COURT: Anybody else have anything they want to
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   talk about?
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             MR. FISCHER: No, Your Honor.
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             MR. TREJO: No, Your Honor.
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              MR. VIETH: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
              THE COURT: We're in recess.
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         (The proceedings recessed at 10:32 a.m.)
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38 CERTIFICATE 1 2 3 I, DEBRA KINNEY CLARK, do hereby certify: That I am an Official Court Reporter for the United 4 5 States District Court at the Eastern District of Washington; That the foregoing proceedings were taken on the date 6 and at the time and place as shown on the first page hereto; and 7 8 That the foregoing proceedings are a full, true and accurate transcription of the requested proceedings, duly 9 transcribed by me or under my direction. 10 I do further certify that I am not a relative of, 11 employee of, or counsel for any of said parties, or otherwise 12 interested in the event of said proceedings. 13 DATED this 18th day of June, 2012. 14 15 16 17 18 /s/Debra Kinney Clark 19 Official Court Reporter United States District Court Eastern District of Washington 20 21 22 23 24 25